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Abstract 
It is possible to view the relations between mathematics and natural language from different aspects. This 
relation between mathematics and language is not based on just one aspect. In this paper the authors 
address the role of the Subject facing reality through language. Perception is defined and a mathematical 
theory of the perceptual field proposed. The distinction between purely expressive language and purely 
informative language is considered false, because the subject is expressed in the communication of a 
message, and conversely, in purely expressive language, as in an exclamation, there is some information. 
To study the relation between language and reality, the function of ostensibility is defined and 
propositions are divided into ostensives and estimatives.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Language is in the origin of the conception of Reality. But, what Reality we are talking 
about? LeShan and Margenau (1982) propose that the organization of knowledge 
divides Reality in domains of experience and in each one of them certain observable 
phenomena are expressed. Some domains have a direct relation with each other and 
when this happens it is possible to make a series of formulations defined by their 
relations. When the domains are interrelated according to scales of dimensions of 
complexity usually we can say that they form a hierarchy. In these conditions, the 
observable phenomena in one domain cannot be conceived nor be predicted generally 
from another domain. But if two domains are considered to be in opposed directions, we 
can verify that the observable phenomena in the second domain can be explained taking 
care of the phenomena of the first domain. According to these authors, an important 
general law concerning domains is as follows: the observable phenomena that appear in 
any domain legitimately are interrelated .In accordance with the present state of 
knowledge and science, no domain of experience is more real than another one. Each 
one has the same worth as another one.  "Nature has neither rind nor bone", said 
Goethe. We chose a domain according to our purposes. Even though the domains are 
related in a hierarchy none of them is more real than the other. The domains enter 
groupings called spheres and each sphere has one special organization of Reality (its 
Metaphysical system) that is necessary so that the data of that sphere are valid. LeShan 
and Margenau define five spheres of experience: 
 
a) Sphere of things too small to be seen or touched at least theoretically: the 
Microcosm.  It is the field of Quantum Mechanics.  
 
b) Sphere of the tactile line of vision and up to the limits of instrumentation.  It 
could be called also the sensory sphere or average existence.   
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c) Sphere of very large objects or things that theoretically happen too fast to be 
seen or to be touched:  Macrocosms.  It is the field of relativistic Physics.   
 
d) Units of conduct with sensory feedback:  conduct units that depend on 
reflections.  
 
e) Sphere of inner human experience, including bodily sensations.   
 
In this work the authors address the role of the Subject facing reality through language. 
The distinction between purely expressive language and purely informative language is 
considered false, because the subject is expressed in the communication of a message, 
and conversely, in purely expressive language, as in an exclamation, there is some 
information. To study the relation between language and reality, the function of 
ostensibility is defined and propositions are divided into ostensives and estimatives. 
 
2. BACKGROUND: REALITY AND FORMAL LANGUAGES  
 
Referring to formal languages, mathematicians seem reluctant to refer to the " concepts 
existing behind the symbols" as meaningless, or to claim that mathematical entities are 
non-existent, and this reluctance is sufficiently justified because of the pejorative nature 
of such terminology. The ontological status of mathematical entities, such as matters of 
paradox, haves a long history of philosophical debates, perhaps because of their close 
relationship to the problem of universals.  
 
Language may be defined like a symbolic substitute of Reality, or as a system of signs. 
Different classes of objects exist, that they are characterized by different mental acts 
through which we perceive them from its surroundings (Meinong, 1904). Objects of 
sensorial perception are different from objects of thought, but these last ones are not less 
"objective" than the previous ones:  they are apprehended through thought but it does 
not constitute them. According to the terminology of Meinong, meaning subsists, 
whereas individual beings and qualities exist.  In this sense, objects of thought can be 
real without existing in the technical sense defined by Meinong.  Mathematical objects 
are of this class.  The first condition is (Agazzi, 1992) that these objects are there, and 
this is not made through an act of discourse, but through the presence of these objects in 
the Subject’s thought.  The phenomenological situation may be that an object, simply by 
the fact of being present, offers to the Subject an irrefutable witness to itself.  The 
referential situation is one of phenomenological presence of the object.  The truth of a 
sentence is the coincidence with the situation of its phenomenological presence. It is to 
notice that meanings or understandings are only partially faithful with respect to any 
particular phenomenological presence or referential situation that they could denote. 
Some form of modalization (alethical, deontical or doxical) necessarily accompanies the 
communication.  Thought and language are epistemologically separate. Language 
organization depends on a complex structure.  Biunivocal correspondence between the 
perception of Reality and the linguistic system is unthinkable.  Perception of reality 
operates from a superior order, from a mesosystem that would include both, and in 
which each appear like elements and not like closed and independent units. The 
horizontal forces of any system are those that determine their potential of significance.  
This means that no language is neutral. That is to say, the systemic conception, like any 
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other semiotic conception, represents the Reality in the same way as other non systemic 
conceptions.   
The mind of the Subject, belonging to a particular society forms a conceptual space of 
representation (CSR) of Reality that includes in principle, three subspaces:   
 
a) Conceptual Subspace of the immediate reality. 
 
b) Conceptual Subspace of representation of the mediate reality 
 
c) Conceptual subspace of representation of the distant reality.  
 
 
In CSR represents the “natural" reality, is to say, the material and energetic transactions, 
like the physical base and its structural base (Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 
2012). In addition the CSR is directly perceivable to thought, or, more directly, can 
have representation in private language. But the fundamental thing is that the 
effectiveness of a language depends mainly, on the existence of a displaced plane, in 
which as much the language as the represented thing exert a mutual tension that can be 
represented in a tense and reticular geometry1. We see then that the objective of 
reaching an understanding of reality by mediation of mental or linguistic models could 
never totally be reached. It means that the linguistic model produces acceptable 
responses, but not inadmissible responses to experienced aspects of reality. That is to 
say, acceptable responses arise from the model, but not inadmissible responses.   
Language is relative as well. How can we speak about absolute being, then? We can and 
we cannot. But that we cannot completely speak about it, it is not a reason to stop 
speaking about it (Wittgenstein, 1972), because we can incompletely represent its 
completeness. Language is used inside a context. Depending of this context language 
will be different. We would not be able to speak about anything if we thought we were 
completely representing reality because languages are incomplete. 
A symbolic system is any system governed by the distinction between the significant 
and significance (Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012; Nescolarde-Selva and 
Usó-Doménech, 2013a.b), a distinction that, although it is specific to the linguistic field, 
implies in addition:   
 
a) A sense perception never arises at the level of an isolated term, but of a 
structured chain where the diverse composing elements is more important that 
the particular nature of these elements.   
 
b) Any modification in some of these elements affects all the chain, and the 
significance always finds a multiplicity of expressions that, latent or present, 
define the framework within which any progress in the evolution of all the 
significances is developed.  
 
All efforts to make correspond, term upon term, significant and significance is devoid of 
sense: it implies that the significant totally preexists to the represented object, because 
1 Reticular geometry is an area of geometry concerned with large and complex geometric objects 
consisting of many articulating components. 
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the language is a set of correlations between certain words and diverse conceptual 
contents, the same number of objects totally determine these contents. However, the 
differentiated units to which the concepts are applied and the significance of these 
concepts is not the reflection of the word that carries them and do not form reality. This 
contingency of the relation between the two faces of the sign springs from the nature of 
human communication, more exactly from the structure of all semiotic system. This is 
simultaneously a unitary structure of two heterogeneous levels of the reality where are 
objects and the differential definition of these objects that only carry information.  
The interaction between nature and culture comes from a humanization of natural 
reality. Nature becomes culture, not in regard to an equivalence ratio, but by integration 
of a certain number of natural elements to a type of order that characterizes the culture. 
This characteristic is a characteristic of all symbolic systems and all discourses, when 
the message contains an additional codification to the personal codes of the language. 
This implies the use of information taken from a sphere different from the sphere in 
where the system works, information that can be physical (colors, sounds, sensations, 
gestures, etc.) or cultural (provided by already existing the semiotic systems) in an 
application that is ordered by virtue of an organization principle. The abuse of a sign, 
resulting from the association of two different spheres from reality, is reinforced by the 
integration of each significant unit in a differentiated system that is unique, allowing the 
appearance of the semantic sense-like effect. The significance is never directly 
attainable but it is indirectly available through instrumental material that is been taken 
from another sphere of reality. Significance is the best we can do in terms of 
understanding the significant in a particular and isolated way, nothing else it can reach 
it. In language, this refraction process is double:  
 
1) At first, it corresponds to the constitution of this same information, that is to say, 
the laws that all images must obey for being significant. This process designates 
the type of culturization of nature.   
 
2) In the second phase, it corresponds to the relation that each one of these 
significant units maintains with other units, and this relation is the unique way of 
defining significances accurately. This process is the elaboration of reality 
operating through the interrelation of these significant units.   
 
Morowitz (2012) argues that one can only talk about one ontology if we are to assume 
that there is only one reality. But there is one Reality? For Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-
Doménech (2013b) the essence of the organization of Reality is that the data of each 
sphere of experience must be taken on its own terms without preconceptions.  What can 
differ in each sphere of experience are not only observables and their relations, not only 
the definitions of space, time, state and observer, but also the methods to study for each 
domain. Therefore, the sender (observer) is located, without being aware of it, in 
fragmented and divided Realities. 
Gershenson and Fernández (2012) use information theory to provide abstract and 
concise measures of complexity, emergence, self-organization, and homeostasis. In this 
paper the authors clarify the meaning of these concepts with the aid of the proposed 
formal measures. 
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Each society structuring a different systemic world view orders its relation to its own 
instruments of thought self distributing the use of space and the temporary extension of 
its own existence.  It is necessary to ask about the relationship between the sender and 
the signs used, how knowledge of cause is created (case of axiomatic systems), how 
learning happens (language) without the sender dominating these operations 
(dream).We show that reference to the intention of the Subject that conceives is 
insufficient to account for everything that is produced, because this being that is 
produced has its existence in relation to other elements of a system, within which all 
creation operates and, except in formal logical or mathematical systems, it never has the 
equivalent of total subjectivity.  Each semiotic system is nourished in a particular 
domain - that comprises a natural or cultural world- and the selection of this material is 
constrictive, because it partially determines the type of syntax that will be applied and 
the concepts used. Thus, each system, more or less complex, will be observed by the 
Subject from a plurality of angles. 
By virtue of this discussion we propose the following principle:   
 
Principle of Semiotic Incompleteness (Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012; 
Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a.b): It is not possible to totally 
characterize a structure of objects or processes, through a language (formal or not), or 
to completely present a portion of "truth" that this language can express on these 
objects or processes through its deductive operation. 
 
3. THE PERCEPTUAL FIELD 
 
Gershenson (2001) defines two types of being: absolute being and relative being. The 
first one is independent of subject S and infinite. Relative being is dependent on the 
Subject, therefore finite, and different in each individual. Absolute being is far from 
materialism and we cannot understand it completely. Materialism is known from 
individual points of view and relative, and we cannot say for sure what absolute beings 
are, because we do not know absolute matter. A Subject can only speculate or suppose 
about the things that are absolute, he cannot be absolutely sure, he can only use 
concepts, because absolute beings are infinite and a Subject is not. A Subject cannot say 
that something in his experience is absolutely true or false. He can only assert beings in 
a relative way and he could assign truth values or vectors to them, but these would be 
relative to his context. The being we know would be the conjunction of relative beings 
we know and absolute being is unknowable, with the corresponding confusion derived 
from the fact that to define and to speak about something that is absolute and infinite is 
impossible, whereas we can talk about what is relative and finite. This is what we do 
every day. Beings do not have an intrinsic meaning and they only transform themselves 
into signs when we invested them with meaning. 
Let S be a subject, and O an object under specified conditions. Maddy’s conditions 
(Maddy, 1990, 1996; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012; Nescolarde-Selva 
and Usó-Doménech, 2013a.b) for physical perceptions are as follows: 
The S perceives O if: 
 
1) There is O. It is the absolute being, referent or designatum. 
 
2) S has perceptual beliefs pB about O, in terms of the appropriate sort of concepts. 
Rather than talking about a physical object belief, one talks about the concept of 
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a physical object, relative being or designata. This is based on the assumption 
that having a concept of a physical object entails that one has physical object 
beliefs. 
 
3) O causes S’s beliefs B about O. 
 
Definition 1: To significances, that are consequence of perceptual beliefs pB on the 
part of a Subject S of an object O with certain characteristic C, we call perceptual 
significances (p-significance) and we denote as ps. 
 
Let ps be a perceptual significance, pB be a set of perceptual significances such 
that { }npspspspB ,....,, 21= , ∧  be an operation meaning "subject S and perceives O" 
(perceptual conjunction),∨  be an operation meaning "subject S or perceives O" 
(perceptual disjunction). 
 
Definition 2: A perceptual field is a set pB that is a commutative group with respect to 
two compatible operations, ∧  and ∨ , with "compatible" being formalized 
by distributivity, and the caveat that the  ∧ identity (ps0) has no ∨ inverse. 
 
Perceptual fields have the following properties:  
 
1) Closure of pB under perceptual conjunction and perceptual disjunction. 
pBpspspspspBpsps ∈∨∧∈∀ 212121 ,;,  
2) Associativity of perceptual conjunction and perceptual disjunction. 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 321321
321321321 ;,,
pspspspspsps
andpspspspspspspBpspsps
∨∨=∨∨
∧∧=∧∧⇒∈∀
 
3) Commutativity of perceptual conjunction and perceptual disjunction. 
1221122121 ;, pspspspsandpspspspspBpsps ∨=∨∧=∧⇒∈∀  
4) Existence of perceptual conjunction and perceptual disjunction identity elements 
There exists an element of pB, called the perceptual conjunction identity element 
and denoted by ps0, such that iii pspspspBps =∧∈∀ 0; . Likewise, there is an 
element, called the perceptual disjunction identity element and denoted by ℵps , 
such that ℵℵ =∨∈∀ pspspspBps ii ; .  
5) Existence of perceptual conjunction inverses and perceptual disjunction inverses 
0/; pspspspspBps iiii =¬∧∃¬∈∀  
 Similarly, for any a in F other than 0, there exists an element a−1 in F, such 
that a · a−1 = 1. ( ) ( ) ℵ−− =∧∃∈∀ pspspspspBps iiiii 11 /;  
 
6) Distributivity of perceptual disjunction perceptual conjunction 
( ) ( ) ( )3121321321 ;,, pspspspspspspspBpspsps ∨∧∨=∧∨⇒∈∀  
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Definition 3: A perceptual field is therefore an algebraic 
structure ℵ
−¬∨∧ pspspB ,,,,,, 0
1 , consisting of two abelian groups: 
1) pB under ∧ , ¬ , and ps0; 
2) pB \ {ps0} under ∨ , −1, and ℵps , with ℵ≠ psps0 , with · distributing over ∧  
 
Note 1: ∧  perceptual conjunction identity element (ps0) means no perception of any 
object. 
 
Note 2: ∨  perceptual disjunction identity element )( ℵps means perception of all objects 
including "silence" or "blanks". 
 
Note 3: ips¬ means no perception of the object whose perceptual significance is ips  
 
Note 4: ( ) 1−ips means perception the complementary to ips  and "silences" or "blanks" 
 
We should ask ourselves how subject S, located before a perceptual field in which there 
are innumerable perceptual significances ps1, to highlight precisely one and leave us 
perceive others. How is this possible, that the circumvented objects Oi have also been 
perceived, if they do not lack quantitatively ostensible traits to justify no perception? It 
is a function of the perceiving subject. The unperceived (Freud, 2010) is a significant. In 
other words what is not perceived is also a component of what is experienced, which 
can be placed in the heart of a polisyntagmatic chain that makes up the total discourse. 
That perception implies, in the logical sense of the word, what has ceased being noticed 
and somehow is discovered in what has been experienced2 . 
By  group theory, applied to the abelian groups (pB×,∨ ), and (pB, ∧ ), the perceptual 
conjunction inverse ips¬  and the perceptual disjunction inverse ( ) 1−ips are uniquely 
determined by ips . 
Similar direct consequences from the perceptual field axioms include 
( ) ( ) ( )212121 pspspspspsps ¬∨=∨¬=∨¬ , in particular ( )ℵ¬=¬ pspsi  as well as 
90 pspspsi =∨ . 
 
4. LANGUAGE AND SUBJECT 
 
Language is primarily an expression or projection of the sender. The message and 
expression are interlinked which means that language and information are also 
intertwined even in those cases where the message is given no ostensible subject, as in 
the case of a CD. The distinction between purely expressive language and purely 
informative language is false, because the subject is expressed in the communication of 
a message, and conversely, in purely expressive language, as in an exclamation, there is 
some information. All this is visible when language as a system becomes speech, which 
2 It is curious to note that in certain schools of Jewish mysticism (Abraham Abulafia), blank spaces of 
Torah signify letters that are more important than real black letters written in the text. For these schools, 
there is a hidden Torah in these blanks between the black letters; the interpretation is that this as where 
each human being has to write in his own existence (Sabán, 2012). 
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is actually a specific form of language; from which all other forms emerge. Even when 
use is made of ad hoc language, as is the case of scientific languages, one can recognize 
transcripts of speech, because they refer to a reality, albeit purely abstract, as in logical 
syntax or the language of theoretical physics. Also formalized languages always contain 
expressive component, so that the sender is more or less notoriously visible. To say 
"more or less notoriously" is to state the following: 
 
1) The constancy of the sender as the origin of the proposition. 
 
2) That being less notoriously in certain forms of language only denotes that the 
receiver requires more hermeneutic effort. 
 
Definition 4 (Russell, 1984): Ostensive definition is the process by which an individual 
receives instruction to understand a lexeme in a different way than through the use of 
other lexemes 
 
We can therefore formulate the following law we will call the Law of ostensibility. 
 
Law of ostensibility: The ostensibility of a sender is in inverse proportion to the 
quantity of information being provided by a particular language. 
 
The jargon of a mathematician seems to say little about the subject that uses it. But it 
would still be susceptible of analysis under ideological considerations, and this refers to 
the objective and subjective conditions of the sender. Morris (1946) was forced to 
recognize the expressive character of language even in the use of simple scientific 
propositions, stating “If a person often uses the language of physics, this may be an 
indication of their interest in certain things before others". Consider the following 
example: 
 
Example 1: Here is a paragraph from Henry James: 
 
The gondola stopped, the old palace was there; it was a house of the class which in 
Venice carries even in extreme dilapidation the dignified name. "How charming! It's 
gray and pink!" my companion exclaimed; and that is the most comprehensive 
description of it. It was not particularly old, only two or three centuries; and it had an 
air not so much of decay as of quiet discouragement, as if it had rather missed its 
career. But its wide front, with a stone balcony from end to end of the piano nobile or 
most important floor, was architectural enough, with the aid of various pilasters and 
arches; and the stucco with which in the intervals it had long ago been endued was rosy 
in the April afternoon.(The Aspern Papers). 
 
 
In a sense, it seems that this piece of Henry James is like a documentary scene. James's 
vision about a certain reality is created so that the reader (receiver) is supplied much 
more easily given the deception of the author’s hypostasize. One wonders after reading: 
Is this all reality? Is it even more essential reality? Does it not involve the information 
of reality lived by him, his situation to reality as a whole, apprehending a parcel to 
circumvent the remaining? Does the nature of the message itself not reside in its 
presence, and its subsequent absence? We can recognize two things: 
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a) Adoption of aloofness, the substantive, with a limited use of adjectives, is 
indicative of the extent James adopts an expectant attitude to reality, as if he 
rejects any affective immersion in it. 
 
b) The reality that the author apprehends (and that he ignores), despite his 
distancing, it's just of the thing, and in addition to certain things, so that, by their 
selection and rejection, James speaks for himself without effort. 
 
This leads us to conclude that language can be seen as a chain of double significants 
(Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 
2013a.b) where the silence is also a significant.   
 
Just before this objectivist paragraph, here's another in which the author manifests his 
presence in what he describes, as if place himself into the character he describes. 
 
Example 2: We will now present a paragraph of Memoirs of Fanny Hill by John 
Cleland 
 
Imagine to yourself, a man rather past threescore, short and ill-made, with a yellow 
cadaverous hue, great goggle eyes, that stared as if he was strangled; an out-mouth 
from two more properly tusks than teeth, livid lips, and breath like a Jake's: then he had 
a peculiar ghastliness in his grin, that made him perfectly frightful, if not dangerous to 
women with child; yet, made as he was thus in mock of man, he was so blind to his own 
staring deformities, as to think himself born to please, and that no woman could see him 
with impunity: in consequence of which idea, he had lavished great sums on such 
wretches as could gain upon themselves to pretend love to his person, whilst to those 
who had not art or patience to dissemble the horror it inspired, he behaved even 
brutally. Impotence, more than necessity, made him seek in variety, the provocative that 
was wanting to raise him to the pitch of enjoyment, which he too often saw himself 
baulked of, by the failure of his powers: and this always threw him into a fit of rage, 
which he wreaked, as far as he durst, on the innocent objects of his fit of momentary 
desire. 
 
In these lines Cleland highlights his inability to distance himself from reality. The value 
judgments in the words, the effects described in the text, and so on, do not connote but 
denote directly, brutally, the author's own axiology. In short, not too much interpretive 
effort is required to learn about Cleland, less effort than required to learn about the 
person described. 
It should be clear that in these passages both James and Cleland, use predicates 
extensively. And secondly, insofar that, in addition to expressing, and reporting, they 
describe objects (people, things) using predicates. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Every language is a double proposition subject-predicate: 
a) The subject of the proposition, depends on the expression of the 
sender. 
b) Of the subject of the sentence is given apparent objectivity by the 
sender despite its subjectivity. 
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All language is meaningful provided it is optional and this optional character is twofold: 
 
1) What to talk about is optional. 
 
2) How to talk is optional. 
 
 
5. SENTENCES AND PROPOSITIONS 
 
The linguistic act should be studied considering the relationship between sender and 
receiver within a context. That is, the linguistic act is to gather sender and receiver, 
speaker and listener, and place both in a real context, outside of which, the language 
would, in fact, uninterpretable (De Ajuriaguerra et al., 1963). The locutional and 
transformational grammars, explain the grammatical and surface structure of the 
sentence by generating structures, and seek to explain, ultimately, the link between 
language, as something given in the form of speech, and the logical syntax of thought 
(which does not have to match the logicality of the sentence). For this reason one must 
ask: how is that we can understand a poorly constructed or deficient sentence?In reality, 
this is only successful insofar as the sender and receiver know the optional nature of the 
language,the character referred to in the situation, the object of the message and even 
then the possibility of misinterpretation is clearly present. Only attention to context, one 
of whose constituents is the receiver (Lepschy, 1964), makes it possible to give 
meaningful character to sentences with low grammaticality, to periphrastic 
constructions, even to silence, which has been relatively unnoticed by linguists. The 
possibilities of understanding (or misunderstanding) above and beyond what is 
superficially expressed, is what has made possible the enormous richness of literary 
expression,and of colloquial language. Such varieties of interpretation or nuances of 
meaning  are due to the significance of what is hidden, because first interpretations 
favor what  is most evident and externalized. All this is because speech "is the actual 
form of consciousness." (Marx, 1998). 
Grammar may be used to analyse a speaker’s language independently of its expressive 
function, using adjectives adverbs and interjections. This means that there can be a 
contradiction because the same grammar can be used in an analysis of a set of sentences 
or of a set of propositions, proposed by a sender. However, two identical sentences with 
the same words may be different as propositions. 
 
Example 3: Is already well≡ Enough!! 
 Is already well ≡ do not need more, let's leave now. 
 
Only when the subject of the sentence and the proposition coincide in the same explicit 
person is one obliged to refer to peculiarities which in any case concern the psychology 
of the sender. 
 
Example 4: Let us consider the sentence: Sarah is in the garden.  
A grammarian can ignore the implicit subject of this proposition - that is, one that issues 
- to materialize, as the object, in the subject of the sentence, in this case "Sarah". But in 
the next sentence: I say Sarah is in the garden we find that there is a subject of the 
proposition, it's me, a subject of the sentence "I say" and a coordinated subject of the 
sentence, "Sarah". 
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To give a general definition of a proposition we will use a simplified procedure from 
Tarski (1956). First, there is a distinction between primitive and compound 
propositions. A primitive proposition is a combination of an individual expression such 
as "Alhambra" and a predicate such as "being in Granada"; there are also primitive 
propositions made up of several individual expressions and predicates. A compound 
proposition is formed from one or more primitive propositions, properly adding "no", 
"or", "and", "if", "then", "all", "at least one" and other connectives. 
Grammar in the classical sense is only obliged to refer to psychological categorizations 
in cases where the subject of the proposition is explicit. In tree diagrams (stegmas) this 
becomes clearer (Figure 1). Let P be a proposition, EG be the external to the sentence 
group (elided), SG be the sentential group, NG be the nominal group and VG be the 
verbal group.  
 
 
 
P
EG SG
(elided)
I say
NG VG
Sarah
V
is 
NF
in the garden
 
Figure 1: Tree diagram of example 4. 
 
But it is evident that sentences are always propositions, i.e., proposals of a sender, and 
do not appear ex nihilo. The consistency of grammar is tested where it is forced to 
surreptitiously estimate the sender’s meaning (Schaff, 1962). And must be said that 
traditional grammar is responsible for fallacies spawned in language use, which have 
been petrified and perpetuated. A particularly serious one in this regard is derived from 
the traditional concepts of predication and attribution. By failing consider the subject of 
the proposition, predicates and attributes are the subject of the sentence, which is true 
for predicates (ie verbal predicates), and false for attributes or nominal predicates. 
 
Example 5: Suppose the sentence: Sarah is beautiful. It is inferred that beauty is the 
property of Sarah, when in any case it is a designation by the subject of the proposition, 
implicit in the subject of the sentence, Sarah. It is clear that while Sarah for the subject 
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X can be beautiful, may not be beautiful for subject Y. In any case, these estimates 
cannot be verified or determined by a supposed referee. 
 
It is estimated that although most of the time the predicate is an adjective, like the 
example above, other times it can be a noun, as in the sentence: Sarah is a teacher. But 
sometimes, a noun can be either an adjective, because the genetic moment, attributed by 
the subject of the proposition, is undeniable and ineludible. So in the sentence: Sarah is 
a woman, it is the tone that is emitted the proposition that decides the interpretation of 
the ambiguity that would result from considering “woman" as a noun (female subject) or 
as an adjective (a synonym of some sexist attribute). 
The perpetuation of verbal fallacies (Russell, 1984) comes from the fact that grammar, 
by dispensing with the subject of the proposition, and attending exclusively to the 
sentence, has contributed to establishing two types of errors: 
 
1) Attributes are properties of the subject of sentence, when in any case they are 
properties that are conferred by the subject of the proposition. 
 
2) The existence of adjectives as attributable properties is inferred from the 
existence of nouns as entities. 
 
Example 6: Given that A, B, C are beautiful it is inferred that beauty exists, but this has 
not been proven by anyone, even in the form of an ostensive definition. 
 
All this is due to inadequate analysis that grammarians have made the verb "to be" 
excusable in those natural languages in which there is no differentiation with the "to 
stand"3. It is curious that verbal predicates as in: 
 
a) Sarah walks. 
b) The dog eats. 
c) The tree falls. 
 
They are grammatically considered as circumstantial when really they denote facts and 
are therefore substantives, however, the qualities like "beautiful", "good", "brave", 
appear as substantives of the subject of sentence and in any case exist outside the 
subject of the proposition to which they are associated. 
 
6. OSTENSIVE AND ESTIMATIVE FUNCTIONS 
 
There is no communication without the triple consideration of what is transmitted in the 
sense proposed by Bühler (2011): 
 
a) Representation. 
 
b) Expression or syntony of someone who transmits. 
 
3 In Spanish there is a difference between "I am" and "I stand". This distinction does not exist in Catalan. 
In Hebrew there is no present tense as it is reserved for God. 
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c) Signal to the receiver. 
 
We will outline three possibilities that language offers when it works as a 
communication medium between sender and receiver: 
 
1) An ostensive definition conveys meaning using examples. In this case a Sender 
refers to an absolute being or referent (Ogden and Richards, 1989), also known 
as designatum (Carnap, 1942). In this case the information about the referent is 
in the foreground. The language in this situation is called an ostensive function 
(OF), because the proposition is the translation of an ostension, equivalent to a 
remark. When the Subject makes a proposition or set of ostensive propositions 
Subject is operating on Reality. We must remember that for the Subject reality is 
processed with a system of signs encoded in language. Both signs and language 
are heterologous systems or related ways of representing reality. This lack of 
congruence between the system of signs that make up the process of the real and 
the codified system of linguistic signs has the following implications: 
 
a) The semiotic system used to represent reality is a continuous and evolving 
process, but the coding is discontinuous. This discontinuity requires the 
perceiving Subject to make an optional decision about which aspect of the 
process of representing Reality to verify.  
b) In turn, the coding performed is optional. 
c) There is one relationship between the systems of the verified coding and the 
processes of representing the real. In any case, this is like a kind of 
interpretation of a sector of reality by denotative significance. 
 
Between Reality conceived as system (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 
2012b) and the linguistic coding system there is no identity (isology) or 
isomorphism, but at most, equivalence. In speaking about Reality, a Subject first 
selects from the perceptual field in a pragmatic way, and then transmits a 
message  even at the expense of substantive categories. 
 
2) Where a proposition does not refer to an observable absolute being what is 
communicated becomes a self evaluative expression. This function is called a 
predicative function (EF) or self evaluative function. 
 
Example 7: (You) look at this landscape is an example of ostensive function. I feel 
depressed is an example of estimative function. 
 
Most often language is made up of mixed propositions in which both ostensive and 
estimative functions occur simultaneously or successively. 
 
Example 8: Suppose the proposition P "This woman is attractive (to me) or I think this 
woman is attractive ". OF is determined by the first member of the proposition (This 
woman) and EF by the second member (I feel she is attractive). In fact, there are two 
propositions, given unitary, but the receiver is forced to separate, to attend to the 
ostension contained immediately before the ulterior estimate. In a tree diagram we will 
have (Figure 2): 
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 P
SG EG
NG=OF
pron
pron
verb adj
prep
This woman is attractive to  me
VG = EF
noun
NG (elided)
 
Figure 2: Tree diagram of mixed propositions. 
 
Example 9: Suppose the proposition P “This is the face of a woman, with her flirtatious 
eyes, small nose, her mouth, her hair ... It's beautiful”. It shows clearly the tendency to 
make the estimation extensional and hence, to encompass to the maximum the whole of 
the perceptual field mentioned. In a diagram we have (Figure 3): 
P
OF EF
OF EF OF EF OF OF
Range 
Range 
 
Figure 3: Diagram of ranges. 
 
On the ratings of the first range we have: 
 
OF = this is the face of a woman 
EF = It's beautiful 
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In the second range we have: 
 
OF = eyes; EF = flirtatious 
OF = nose; EF = small 
OF = mouth 
OF = hair 
 
Hypothesis 2: The process of communication of information requires understanding the 
message, supplied via a certain code, superimposed on the understanding of the sender, 
which the message expresses. 
 
Thus, the transmission of information is not simply from message to message, not even 
sent message to understood message, but subject to subject. What the sender sends to 
the receiver is a significant that simultaneously emits linguistic signs (Morris, 1946). 
Every proposition cannot be conceived simply as predicate subject, but as an act of 
personalization, as the sender’s personal proposal. For an entire sentence to be 
informative, it must be presented as expressive of a way of being and of understanding 
reality by the sender, precisely because the optional double character of communication 
having, on one hand, the sector of reality that is apprehended and on the other, the form 
and content of the message. Therefore: 
 
Definition 5: The significance of a linguistic sign is the joined result of the subjective 
judgment, by the sender, of absolute being (referent) and subjective appreciation for the 
receiver, from the viewpoint of the subject of the transmitted information. 
 
A linguistic sign has meaning when sent while there is a relationship between the 
denotative significance and the absolute being which is denoted, and the receiver 
understands what is communicated (Quine, 1960). When this coincidence does not 
emerge, no communication exists and the ambiguity appears which sender and receiver 
confer different connotative significance to the same denotative significance. 
For Quine (1960) there is a category of lexemes, and in general terms, units of 
significance (moneme on) which play an ostensive function. These lexemes would be 
the extension of demonstrative pronouns "this", "that", etc. 
 
Definition 6: We call ostensive those lexemes that function as verbal pointersto 
references external to the sender that may be real or unreal.  
 
These minimal units of significance require an address to a reference that the sender 
locates outside himself. 
In our theory we will divide propositions into ostentives and estimatives. 
 
Definition 7: An ostensive proposition (O) is one in which the sender specifies 
connotations that apply to the reference, i.e., the nature of the qualitative and 
quantitative apprehension of reality that at that moment constitutes a referent. 
 
Example 10: A proposition P = the book is on the table, is an ostensive proposition. 
 
Definition 8: An estimative proposition (E) is one which plays an ostensive role not 
with respect to the referent, but to the sender. 
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Example 11: A proposition P = I think Bach the best musician, is an estimative 
proposition. 
 
 
7. REFLECTIONS 
 
Language is relative as well. How can we speak about absolute being, then? We can and 
we cannot. Not being able to speak about absolute being completely is not a reason to 
stop speaking about it (Wittgenstein, 1972), because we can incompletely represent its 
completeness. Otherwise we would not be able to speak about anything, because 
languages are incomplete in their descriptions. Language is used inside a context, and 
depending of this context language will be different. 
We have sought to answer in this paper some of the questions suggested by reviewers. 
Firstly, we do not know exactly if reality is one or is fragmented, because we are part of 
the same reality, although the idea of different spheres of experience, of which we have 
discussed in the first section, suggests that this is a useful way to consider it. 
Secondly, the world of events and entities are considered measured terms rather than 
phenomenological realities. To fulfill its function (linguistics), the names and terms 
should be syntactic fixed like all the other units of measurement and comparison. But 
their use is so successful that the danger of confusing these terms of measurement and 
comparison (model) with the measured world is to confuse convention with ontology, 
and to reduce the rich reality to the model. Linguistic structures, with which we form 
judgments or propositions do not allow a transitive verb without a subject or predicate. 
When there is "knowledge" the grammatical convention requires the existence of the 
knower and that which is known. Man is so used to it that when we talk and think and  
build our models, he does not realize that it is just that, a convention, and that the model 
does not correspond to the actual experience of knowledge. The fire of knowledge itself 
risks being quenched by the ashes of ignorance. Linguistic structures themselves 
impede the full apprehension of Reality א. 
Just being aware of it, just knowing our limits, we can begin to catch a glimpse of the 
Reality א that is being continually denied. And this the only way we will achieve a basic 
principle of knowledge, which is so forgotten - humility. 
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